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    Given a limited warning time, an asteroid impact mitigation campaign would hinge on 
uncertainty-based information consisting of remote observational data of the identified Earth-threatening 
object, general knowledge on near-Earth asteroids, and engineering judgment. Due to these ambiguities, 
the campaign credibility could be profoundly compromised. It is therefore imperative to comprehensively 
evaluate the inherent uncertainty in deflection and plan the campaign accordingly to ensure successful 
mitigation. This research demonstrates dual-deflection mitigation campaigns consisting of primary and 
secondary deflection missions, where both deflection performance and campaign credibility are taken into 
consideration. The results of the dual-deflection campaigns show that there are trade-offs between the 
competing aspects: the total interceptor mass, interception time, deflection distance, and the confidence in 
deflection. The design approach is found to be useful for multi-deflection campaign planning, allowing us 
to select the best possible combination of deflection missions from a catalogue of various mitigation 
campaign options, without compromising the campaign credibility. 
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Nomenclature 
 
𝐩 :  mitigation system design parameters 
𝐱 :  mitigation system design variables 
𝐲 :  mitigation performance indicators 
𝑚 :  mass 
𝑡 :  date 
𝑏 :  deflection distance on b-plane 
𝐵𝑒𝑙 :  Belief; probabilistic measure 
vimp :  kinetic impact velocity at rendezvous 
tpush :  time period of gravity tractoring 
𝑡𝑜𝑓 :  time of flight 
 Subscripts 
0 :  initial / Earth departure 
1 :  primary interceptor 
2 :  secondary interceptor 
f1 :  primary interception completion 
f2 :  secondary interception completion 
MOID :  minimal orbital interception distance 
nom :  nominal 
safe :  safety 
trim :  trim 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Asteroid deflection and retrieval technologies are rapidly 
becoming of interest amongst scientists, engineers, and 
politicians particularly after asteroid 2012 DA14 Earth’s flyby 
and the Chelyabinsk meteor event occurred early in 2013. 
NASA is now planning to send a robotic mission to a 500-ton, 
<10-metre-wide near-Earth asteroid (NEA), safely redirect it 
to a lunar orbit, and perform in-situ robotic and human 
exploration for both planetary defense and resource utilisation 
purposes. However, asteroid deflection and retrieval initiatives 
are both still in their infancy and thus abound in scientific, 
engineering, political, and educational challenges to be 
addressed at the international level. 
As of today, several asteroid deflection concepts have been 
proposed. Some of these concepts appear to be feasible with 
the current technology developed through deep space 
exploration missions, whereas others require certain levels of 
technological advancement before they can be considered as 
feasible deflection alternatives. Also, a deflection technique 
which makes use of nuclear devices for example, involves 
political issues to be tackled by the international planetary 
defense community. Nevertheless, we now recognise that it is 
not unrealistic to prevent an impact event by a modest-sized 
(<150 metres in diameter) NEA if it can be discovered and 
identified to be threatening about a decade in advance of the 
impact event.1) Most importantly, even such small asteroids 
can cause a local devastation far greater than the Tunguska 
event in 1908 or the recent Chelyabinsk meteor event on 
February 15th 2013.2) Based on the NEA population that has 
been discovered so far, it is more likely that hazardous NEAs 
to be mitigated will be in this modest size range, rather than 
kilometre-sized NEAs which can potentially trigger a global 
catastrophe such as the K-T boundary impact event. The K-T 
boundary impact event is believed to be the cause of the mass 
extinction of dinosaurs approximately 65 million years ago. 
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Recent work by Sugimoto et al.3,4) has shown that, for 
particularly short warning-time impact scenarios (i.e. 10 
years), only limited information about the hazardous NEA 
would be available and that this will most likely come only 
from ground-based or space-based characterisation approaches. 
In such cases, the majority of deflection techniques will be 
subject to epistemic uncertainties and measurement errors in 
the NEA characteristics, which could lead to compromised 
outcomes of mitigation. 
Fig. 1 shows confidence levels on the outcome of kinetic 
impactor (KI) subject to different degrees (associated with the 
ground-based and proximity characterisation scenarios) of 
uncertainty in NEA mass. There are two probability measures 
called Belief and Plausibility which represent different 
confidence levels.5) In general, Belief represents a confidence 
level of the truth of an event (i.e. deflection) excluding 
uncertainty whereas Plausibility represents a confidence level 
of the truth of the same event including uncertainty.
 Particularly when the preliminary NEA characterisation is 
incomplete, the confidence level on the outcome of deflection 
attempt is substantially jeopardised. 
It is therefore essential to investigate mitigation campaign 
planning that involves design of a reliable and robust NEA 
mitigation system which guarantees high confidence in 
successful mitigation campaign even if the preliminary NEA 
characterisation is incomplete. 
The main objective of this research is to demonstrate a 
mitigation campaign planning approach that results in efficient, 
reliable, and yet robust NEA mitigation for short warning-time 
cases. The additional objective is to ensure the flexibility in 
deflection in order to avoid undesired key-hole passage on the 
b-plane6) due to the primary interception. 
To fulfil these objectives, we have considered a 
dual-deflection mitigation approach that makes use of an 
instantaneous deflection technique (KI) as a primary 
deflection mission and a slow-push deflection technique 
(gravity tractor; GT) as a secondary deflection mission. The 
use of a GT as a secondary deflection mission for the 
secondary impact keyhole avoidance was suggested in the JPL 
report by Yeomans et al.7) in 2008. They also pointed out that 
tracking of the GT spacecraft would provide precise 
information about the asteroid orbit before and after the 
primary deflection mission and also after the GT trim 
manoeuvre. Their study however, assumed the range of the 
momentum enhancement factor 𝛽 of the NEA (1 < 𝛽 < 5) 
in order to evaluate possible outcomes of the primary 
interception achieved through a KI instead of considering the 
uncertainties in the NEA characteristics. Such combined 
mitigation measures have been also investigated as a part of 
the NEOShield project.8) 
Design of a dual-deflection mitigation campaign involves 
trade-offs between the competing aspects (the total interceptor 
mass, interception time, deflection distance, and the confidence 
in deflection) which are to be optimised in order to minimise 
the launch cost of NEA mitigation systems and total campaign 
period while maximising the deflection performance (i.e. 
deflection distance on the b-plane of the impact epoch) and 
the confidence in successful mitigation campaign (i.e. Belief 
of the nominal deflection distance). 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Uncertainty in deflection by KI. A) Ground-based. B) Proximity. 
Confidence levels on achieving a given deflection distance on the b-plane 
are represented by Belief and Plausibility, respectively. 
 
2.  Mitigation campaign planning 
 
Mitigation campaigns should be accurately planned in order 
to provide a successful deflection even if the preliminary NEA 
characterisation is based on ground-based telescope/radar 
observation. Sending multiple spacecraft/interceptors of one 
specific type of deflection technique (e.g. the multiple solar 
mirror concept of Maddock et al.9) and the multiple GT 
concept of Foster et al.10)) can increase the deflection 
efficiency as well as the redundancy of a given deflection 
mission. However, such mitigation campaigns are inevitably 
subject to the uncertain performance of a specific deflection 
technique due to not only the epistemic uncertainties in the 
NEA characteristics but aleatory/practical uncertainties in the 
technique (e.g. the precision of a KI, the time-variable 
sublimation efficiency of a SC, etc.). 
To overcome the limits imposed on NEA mitigation 
campaigns of a single type deflection mission and to make the 
campaigns more reliable and robust, this work focuses on 
mitigation campaigns consisting of primary and secondary 
deflection missions (i.e. dual-deflection campaigns). The 
primary deflection mission makes use of an instantaneous 
deflection technique whereas the secondary deflection mission 
makes use of a slow push deflection technique. The final 
outcome of a dual-deflection campaign is therefore 
determined by the secondary deflection mission which 
performs its slow-push interception according to the 
instantaneous outcome of the primary interception that could 
be fully successful, partly successful, or at worst, a complete 
A) 
B) 
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failure. The secondary deflection mission should also be 
capable of preventing the NEA from undesired keyhole 
passage on the 2036 b-plane due to the primary deflection 
mission in order to avoid a subsequent Earth impact. 
 
2.1.  Dual-deflection campaign 
 
Dual-deflection campaigns studied here consist of a 
primary interceptor (KI) and a secondary interceptor (GT). Fig. 
2 represents an example of dual-deflection campaign 
consisting of a KI and a GT (i.e. KI-GT campaign). The 
hazardous NEA, namely VI1 is one of the virtual Earth 
impactors that have been generated from a realistic population 
of impactors by taking into account the relative impact 
frequency of each possible trajectory.11) VI1 is an Apollo 
asteroid and identified as an Earth impactor 10 years before the 
impact on 2036/4/13. The transfer orbits of the KI and GT are 
designed by solving a two-body Lambert’s problem. A 
conventional chemical propulsion system of 𝐼𝑠𝑝 = 300 sec 
is used as a kick stage at Earth departure and to accelerate or 
decelerate at the final approach to the target NEA. For the 
case of KI-GT campaign, two interceptors are sent to the NEA 
separately and hence follow two different trajectories. This is 
due to the fact that the KI takes advantage of a higher relative 
velocity at the NEA encounter whereas the GT requires a 
smaller relative velocity at the NEA rendezvous in order to 
reduce the total amount of delta-v for the orbital transfers. For 
this reason, the GT arrival can be, in theory, earlier than the 
KI’s arrival. In this case, we assume that the secondary 
interception (GT) can be operational before and after the 
primary interception (KI) takes place according to the 
proximity characterisation of the target NEA conducted by 
GT. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Example of KI-GT campaign against VI1. 
 
3.  Campaign optimisation 
 
The most notable feature of asteroid deflection mission is 
that the characteristics (orbital parameters, physical properties, 
dynamical properties, etc.) of the NEA are deeply embedded 
into the design as an integral part of the mitigation systems, 
and influence their deflection performance. Fig. 3 is a 
schematic diagram that describes such asteroid mitigation 
system design as multidisciplinary system design. The 
mitigation system design involves three basic vectors 𝐩, 𝐱, 
and 𝐲 where 
 
 p is a vector of design parameters representing fundamental 
properties of the hazardous NEA (e.g. orbit, physical 
property, etc.) and environmental parameters (e.g. gravity, 
solar constant, radiation pressure, etc.). 
 
 𝐱 is a vector of mitigation system design variables (e.g. 
mass and impact velocity of KI, mass of nuclear interceptor 
(NI), mirror size of solar collector (SC), mass and hovering 
altitude of GT, etc.). 
 
 𝐲 is a vector of mitigation performance indicators for the 
campaign (e.g. total mass of mitigation systems, total 
interception time, deflection distance, confidence in 
deflection, etc.). 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Hazardous NEA mitigation system design. 
 
The minimum and maximum values of design variables 𝐱 
for a KI-GT campaign are given in Table 1. m1 and m2 are the 
masses of primary and secondary mitigation systems at  NEA 
arrival, respectively. t1 and tof1 are the Earth departure time 
and the flight time of the primary interceptor whereas t2 and 
tof2 are the Earth departure time and the flight time of the 
secondary interceptor. vimp is the relative velocity component 
of the KI parallel to the flight direction of the NEA. tpush is the 
tractoring/interception period of the GT. 
 
Table 1.  Design variables 𝐱 for a KI-GT campaign. 
m1 (kg) 500 – 10000 
m2 (kg) 500 – 20000 
t1 2026/4/13 – 2033/7/11 
tof1 (day) 100 – 1000 
t2 2026/4/13 – 2033/7/11 
tof2 (day) 100 – 1000 
vimp (km/s) 0 – 30 
tpush (day) 0 – 3650 
  
The deflection representation of hazardous NEAs is based 
on the b-plane concept that is applied to planetary encounter 
analyses.6) The minimum distance of the unperturbed 
trajectory at the closest approach point on the b-plane is called 
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the impact parameter b. The impact parameter itself does not 
reveal whether the perturbed trajectory will intersect the Earth 
sphere; however, it can be available by scaling Earth’s radius 
RE as 
 
𝑏E = RE√1 + vesc2 v∞2⁄               (1) 
 
where RE is the Earth radius, vesc is Earth’s escape velocity, 
and v ∞  is the hyperbolic excess velocity of an Earth 
encountering object. A given trajectory intersects the Earth 
sphere if 𝑏 is smaller than the scaled Earth-radius bE, and not 
otherwise. The objective of NEA mitigation is therefore to 
ensure that a given deflection is greater than bE on the b-plane 
of the impact epoch. 
In order to design a dual-deflection campaign, a number of 
trade-offs between competing aspects must be evaluated and 
optimised. The campaign optimisation problem requires 
evaluating the figures of merit (i.e. the mitigation performance 
indicators vector 𝐲) that characterise the performance and the 
confidence in a successful mitigation campaign. 𝐲 consists of 
m0, tf1, tf2, bnom, and Belnom where: 
 
 m0 is the total mass of two NEA mitigation systems at the 
Earth departure stage (EDS), which should be as small as 
possible to reduce the cost of the mitigation campaign. 
 tf1 is the completion time of the primary deflection mission, 
which is desirable to be as early as possible such that a 
longer interception by the secondary deflection mission after 
the primary interception can be available. In addition, earlier 
completion of the primary interception is simply preferable 
for safety reasons. 
 tf2 is the completion time of the secondary deflection 
mission (i.e. campaign completion time), which should also 
be as early as possible such that an additional mitigation 
campaign can be launched, if necessary. 
 bnom is the nominal deflection on the b-plane, which is 
desired to be as large as possible in the range of bE <bnom< 
bsafe. 
 Belnom is Belief of nominal deflection, and thus higher Belief 
indicates higher confidence in successful mitigation. 
 
In this work, there are a series of constraints that are 
assumed for demonstration purposes of feasible and desirable 
hazard mitigation campaigns. m0 is limited to 200 tons and tf1 
can be no later than tf2 in order to allow the secondary 
interceptor to conduct a necessary trim manoeuvre for keyhole 
avoidance after the primary interception. The nominal 
deflection bnom must be at least bE and can be as large as bsafe. 
The deflection distance btrim that can be provided by the trim 
manoeuvre of the secondary deflection mission by GT after 
the primary interception must be greater than 1000 km. This 
seems to be more than enough to avoid undesired keyhole 
passage due to the primary deflection mission according to the 
JPL report.7) 
The fast and elitist multiobjective genetic algorithm 
NSGA-II12) is used here to compute Pareto optimal design 
points of dual-deflection mitigation campaigns. A total of 
2400 solutions for 𝐲 are numerically computed in MATLAB. 
 
3.1.  Results and discussion 
 
The results of KI-GT campaigns against VI1 of S-type 
asteroid characterised at the ground-based level are presented 
in Fig. 4. The Pareto-optimal solutions for the campaigns are 
presented in terms of the campaign completion time (i.e. the 
completion time tf2 of the GT) and the total interceptor mass 
m0 at the EDS, which are categorised into eight different 
levels of the Belief measure of nominal deflection; Belnom. 
One of the notable aspects of dual-deflection campaigns is 
that Belnom is highly dependent on both total interceptor mass 
m0 at the EDS and the campaign completion time tf2. For the 
KI-GT campaign scenario, there are quite a few optimal 
KI-GT campaigns available within 100–150 tons of m0, given 
Belnom≤0.57 and 2–4 years of tf2, whereas there are almost no 
KI-GT campaigns available within 100–150 tons of m0, given 
Belnom≥0.83 and <4 years of tf2. 
Also, it can be seen that a longer campaign period (>6 
years) does not necessarily increases the overall mitigation 
performance including Belnom but actually there are many 
optimal dual-deflection campaigns with a nominal deflection 
as large as 2.5 Earth-radii within 3–6 years of tf2 for 
Belnom≥0.70 without requiring a significantly large amount of 
total interceptor mass relative to that for longer-term 
campaigns. This appears to be simply due to the fact that later 
asteroid deflection missions are less efficient than earlier ones. 
Particularly for the KI-GT campaign scenario against VI1, 
the GT rendezvous with the NEA is approximately <2 years 
before or <1 year after the KI arrival/interception time 
depending on the respective KI-GT campaign sequences, 
where the former case is found to be highly beneficial in terms 
of the proximity characterisation of the NEA as well as of the 
precise guidance of the KI by GT. The GT might start 
tractoring immediately after the NEA rendezvous without 
waiting for the KI arrival/impact, however most importantly, 
this is not always the case particularly when the true values of 
the NEA physical properties are in the nominal conditions or 
much more favourable conditions (e.g. less heavy NEA mass 
than expected, smaller in size, etc.). If the in-situ NEA 
physical characteristics result in a favourable outcome, the GT 
will simply add an extra deflection to the outcome of the 
primary interception. 
In addition, the avoidance of undesired keyhole passage due 
to the primary interception is fulfilled, counting on the 
reserved deflection btrim by the GT trim manoeuvre after the 
primary interception. The period of time to achieve btrim 
ranges from 107 days to 9.35 years and is, not surprisingly, 
proportional to the confidence level of each campaign. 
Furthermore, the preliminary results of the KI-GT 
campaign scenario imply that not only the NEA arrival but the 
Earth departure of the KI could be even later than the GT 
arrival at the NEA, depending on the availability that is 
subject to the launch window, warning time, NEA orbit, etc. 
This would be beneficial for the mitigation system design of 
KI as a primary interceptor because the GT can conduct 
preliminary characterisation of the NEA at the proximity level 
in advance of the Earth departure of the KI, and thus 
investigating the availability of such a precursor 
characterisation mission by GT is subject of future work. 
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Fig. 4.  Optimal solutions for KI-GT campaigns. Darker shades of blue 
represent higher values of bnom whereas fainter shades represent lower 
values of bnom. A) Belnom≥0.47. B) Belnom≥0.51. C) Belnom≥0.56. D) 
Belnom≥0.57. E) Belnom≥0.70. F) Belnom≥0.83. G) Belnom≥0.97. H) 
Belnom≥1.00. 
 
A) 
C) 
B) 
E) 
D) 
F) 
H) G) 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
A hazardous NEA mitigation campaign planning based on 
uncertain information on the fundamental asteroid 
characteristics has been studied to improve the mitigation 
campaign credibility, where one of the possible forms of 
mitigation campaign – dual-deflection campaign – has been 
investigated in detail. In order to evaluate the confidence level 
on deflection missions subject to the uncertain NEA 
characteristics, the uncertainty quantification technique called 
Evidence Theory is used. The preliminary results of the 
dual-deflection campaigns consisting of a primary KI and a 
secondary GT have shown that: 
 
 Dual-deflection campaign planning involves a series of 
competing aspects that must be assessed and constraints 
associated with the specific configurations of KI-GT to be 
satisfied to plan a mitigation campaign with sufficient 
performance (i.e. deflection) and high confidence in 
successful deflection (i.e. Belief). 
 Given a GT as a secondary deflection mission, Belief of 
nominal deflection can be improved by years of GT 
interception manoeuvre before and after a primary 
deflection mission for the KI-GT campaign scenario. 
However this does not necessarily means that the GT must 
always commence its interception immediately after the 
NEA rendezvous but the actual operation of the GT is 
subject to the in-situ NEA characteristics. 
 Given a 10-year warning time, a mitigation campaign with a 
completion time of approximately half the warning time 
seems to be more reasonable than a longer-term mitigation 
campaign or a mitigation campaign with a heavier total 
interceptor mass at the EDS. In other words, this appears to 
be due to the deflection performance decrease with time and 
increase in the launch cost of necessary mitigation systems 
for a shorter-term mitigation campaign. 
 Possible keyhole passage due to undesired deflection by a 
primary interception can be avoided by a GT as a secondary 
deflection mission in a dual-deflection campaign, given the 
necessary amount of deflection in order to avoid the keyhole 
passage is 1000km. 
 
Finally, the particular campaign planning approach 
presented here could be useful for the near-future hazard 
mitigation campaigns where we might have to tap into our 
incomplete knowledge on NEAs for mitigation campaign 
design, allowing us to select the best possible combination of 
deflection missions from a catalogue of various possible 
mitigation campaign options, without compromising the 
campaign credibility. However in the foreseeable future, 
further knowledge about the NEA population and some 
specific NEAs will have steadily accumulated and improved 
through the forthcoming NEA survey and exploration 
missions such as NEOSSat, Sentinel, Hayabusa2, and 
OSIRIS-Rex as well as the recently announced NASA’s NEA 
retrieval mission to be launched as soon as the year 2017. 
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